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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GERALD D. LUNDAHL,

))

Petitioner/Appellee,

]

vs.

)

RUTH M. LUNDAHL,
Respondent/Appellant.

CASE NO. 20030800 CA

;
]

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

INTRODUCTION
Appellant ("Marlene") filed two opening briefs, one on December 1,2003 and another
on February 6, 2004. The cover of the first opening brief is gray, only allowed for an
appellant reply brief, in violation of Rule 27(d), Utah Rules Appellant Procedure
(MU.R.App.P.ff) It appears that throughout this appeal, Marlene has ignored the rules of
appellant procedure. Rule 24, U.R. App.P., implies that Marlene is allowed only one opening
brief. Consequently, her December 1, 2003 brief and all supplements thereto should be
rejected by this Court. This appellee brief shall only deal with the appellant opening brief
filed February 6, 2004. Since this brief is also not in compliance with the applicable rules
of appellant procedure, specifically the totality of Rules 24(a), including all subparts, the
Order of the trial court should be affirmed and Marlene's brief should be rejected.1 This
l

See State v. Lucero, 2002 UT APP 135,47 P.2d 107, 109 [Because defendant failed
to make a statement of the issues presented for review with citations to the record, failed to
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Court has the power to sua sponte reject Marlene's brief for her failure to comply with this
rule. Additionally, appellee ("Gerald") is filing a motion to have this Honorable Court reject
appellant's brief and affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, out of an abundance
of caution and in light of the forthcoming motion to reject Marlene's opening brief, Gerald's
is filing his brief in accordance with the briefing schedule and order enlarging the time for
the filing of this brief.
Additionally, Marlene's brief, as it is, fails to comply with Rule 24(a)(8) and (9). This
non-compliance made it extremely difficult for Gerald to respond to the points Marlene
attempted to make. For example, Marlene lacks adequate cites to the record as required by
Rule 24(a)(9). She makes blanket statements without any support such as "the Plaintiff
acquiesced to Utah Jurisdiction by submitting a complaint along with the registration in Utah
of the California 1977 Dissolution Order . . . ." She cites no part of the record or any
authority for this statement. Consequently, Gerald will submit a brief based upon what he
submitted in the trial court to demonstrate that the Fourth District Court lacked the subject
matter jurisdiction to modify the 1977 California Dissolution Order, that the decision of the
trial court to grant his Motion to Strike was correct and should be affirmed by this Court.

set forth the proper standard of review, and failed to include any relevant citations, authority,
or "meaningful analysis that would support his allegations that the evidence was
insufficient", the court determined that his briefing was inadequate and affirmed the trial
court decision.]; and Randle v. Randle, 2002 UT APP 197 [The appellant was appearing pro
se and failed to comply with Rule 24 - the standard of appellant review and made no
citations to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court, the Court of
Appeals rejected his brief and affirmed the decision of the trial court.]
-2-

JURISDICTION
The February 6, 2004 opening brief of appellant ("brief) fails to provide any
statements showing the jurisdiction of the appellant court as required by Rule 24(a)(4),
U.R. App.P. Accordingly, her brief should be rejected and the lower court decision affirmed.
Ruth M. Lundahl appeals from an order of the Fourth District Court determining that the
Fourth District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the California Decree of
Divorce involving the parties. Hence, all orders of the Fourth District Court purporting to
modify the California Decree as to spousal support are void for lack of jurisdiction. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and (j).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court correctly granted appellee's Motion to Strike

Respondent's Order to Show Cause upon the grounds that the court lacked the subject matter
juiisdiction to enforce the April 13, 1995 Order entered by Judge Guy Burningham
purporting to modify the California Judgment concerning spousal support.
Standard of Review: A determination of whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law. Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah
App. 1992). This court accords no deference to the trial court's determination but reviews it
for correctness. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah
App. 1993). If a court lacks jurisdiction "it has not power to entertain the suit." Crump v.
Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Utah App. 1991).
2.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the Fourth District Court lacked the
-3-

subject matter jurisdiction to enter its April 13,1995 Order purporting to modify the Superior
Court of the State of California, the County of Los Angeles, Judgment Determining Property
and Support Issue [sic] ("Judgment") in the case of Lundahl v. Lundahl, Case No. SE D
36650, on the 14th day of September, 1977; therefore, the Fourth District Court April 13,
1995 order is void and unenforceable.
Standard of Review: A determination of whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law. Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah
App. 1992). This court accords no deference to the trial court's determination but reviews it
for correctness. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah
App. 1993).
3.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the Superior Court of the State of

California, the County of Los Angeles, the issuing court that entered the Judgment on the 14th
day of September, 1997, had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter of spousal support.
Standard of Review: A determination of whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law. Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah
App. 1992). This court accords no deference to the trial court's determination but reviews it
for correctness. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah
App. 1993).
4.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the Uniform Interstate Family

Support Act ("UIFSA") applied retroactively to this case.
-4-

Standard of Review: Trial court may exercise broad discretion in adjusting the
financial interests of the parties, so long as the decision is within the confines of legal
precedence. Crocket v. Crocket, 836 P.2d 818, 819-820 (Utah App.1992). Where a trial
court may exercise broad discretion, the court of appeals presume the correctness of the
court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of. . .
discretion.' Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah App.1987).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-22a-l, et. seq. and 78-45f-100, et seq.

STATEMENT TO THE CASE
On September 14, 1977, the parties were divorced pursuant to a California divorce
decree. (R. 10-23) The California court, in the decree, specifically retained jurisdiction over
the parties and subject matter of the decree. (R. 24) At the time, both parties resided in
California. (R. 14, 20-21) Shortly thereafter, appellant moved to Utah, taking the parties'
minor children with her. (R. 2) Throughout this protracted litigation, Gerald has always been
a resident of California, he has never resided in Utah. (R. 599) When appellant interfered
with appellee's visitation, he brought the California decree to Utah and had it domesticated
pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act solely for the purpose of enforcing its provisions
against Marlene. (R. 2-6, 28) Subsequently, Marlene attempted to have the California
decree modified, even though appellee brought domesticated it in Utah solely for
enforcement puiposes. (R. 29-31) Never once in any of her Fourth District Court petitions
-5-

to modify the California decree did Marlene cite any references to URESA, RURESA, or
USIFSA as authority for her petitions to modify. All she mentioned were substantial and
material changes of circumstances. In these petitions, she did not allege anything such as
lack of due process or subject matter jurisdiction that would be considered a defense to the
enforcement of the Judgment (R. 30-31, 198-201, 577-580).
Upon the advice of counsel, Gerald stipulated to have the California decree modified
by the Fourth District Court. (R. 62) Subsequently, at least three orders were issued by the
Utah court purporting to modify the spousal support award in the California decree. (R. 126127 [1983 order], 221-223 [April 24, 1991 order], R. 473-476 [April 13, 1995 order]) These
orders substantially modified the amount of support decreed by the California court.
At the same time, Marlene submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the originating
decree state - California Superior Court in various attempts to modify spousal support during
the same or similar periods she was doing the same in the Fourth District Court of the State
of Utah. The California Superior Court entered several orders modifying Gerald's spousal
support and custody of the minor children. (R. 209-214,305-310,715-720 [August 24,1987
order], 547-548 [November 16, 1994], 721-722 [March 3, 1989], and 723-724 [May 5,
1993]. With the entry of the May 5, 1993 California Order, Marlene lost custody of her last
and youngest child to Gerald. (R 723-724, 11) Consequently, California became the home
state for the child custody aspect of the originating decree.
Finally, on May 28, 2002 (R. 589), Marlene filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause
and on May 29,2002, an Order to Show Cause was issued (R. 589), commanding Gerald to
-6-

appear and show cause regarding his contempt. In response, Gerald filed a Motion to Strike
Marlene's Order to Show Cause (R. 640-641) and memorandum (R. 644-677) arguing that
the Fourth District Court did not have the jurisdiction to modify a California Support Decree
when Gerald continued to reside in California since the entry of the decree and only initially
brought the California decree to Utah for enforcement purposes only.
On May 29, 2003 (R. 789, 712), the trial court heard arguments on Gerald's Motion
to Strike and Marlene's Order to Show Cause. At the conclusion of the arguments, the trial
court asked for additional briefing. Consequently, on June 11, 2003 (R. 715-739), Gerald
filed a Supplemental Brief. On June 13, 2003, two days after the deadline for filing
supplemental briefs, Marlene filed one. (R. 740-758) On July 21, 2003, the trial court
issued its Ruling granting Gerald's Motion to Strike, in essence ruling that the Fourth District
Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to modify or amend the California decree. (R.
781-789) On September 22, 2004, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
ofLaw, and Order in conformity with its decision. (R. 1037-1045) On September 28, 2003,
Marlene filed a Notice of Appeal, which did not comply with Rule 3(d), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. (R. 1048-1101) (Gerald is filing a Motion to Strike this Notice for its
non-compliance.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

A Judgment Determining Property and Support Issue [sic] ("Judgment") in the

case of Lundahl v. Lundahl was issued in the Superior Court of the State of California for
the County of Los Angeles, Case No. SE D 36650, on the 14th day of September, 1977. (R.
-7-

10-23) The California Superior Court ("Decree State") specifically retained jurisdiction over
the parties and subject matter. (R. 24)
2.

Paragraph 6 of the Judgment deals with Spousal Support. Marlene was granted

$600 per month in alimony. (R. 13) At the end of the paragraph, the Court "retains
jurisdiction to reduce or increase said support as needs occur". (R. 24)
3.

At the time of the issuance of the Judgement, Appellee ("Gerald") and

Appellant ("Marlene") resided in California. (R. 14, 20-21)
4.

Shortly after the issuance of the Judgment, Marlene moved with the children

to Utah. (R. 2)
5.

Throughout this veiy protracted litigation, Gerald has always been a resident

of California. He did not reside in Utah. (R. 599)
6.

After moving to Utah, Marlene interfered with Gerald's visitation.

Consequently, he domesticated the Judgment in Utah pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment
Act to enforce the Judgment. (R. 2-6, 28)
7.

Even though Gerald brought the Judgment to Utah for enforcement purposes

only, Marlene attempted to modify the California Judgment in a Utah court. (R. 29-31.) Her
first attempt at such occurred June 23, 1978. (R. 29-31.) Her second attempt to modify the
Judgment occurred on January 3, 1991. (R. 198-201.) In any petition to modify filed in the
Fourth District Court, Marlene never alleged URES A, RURES A, or USIFS A as authority for
the modification. The modification attempts were based solely upon substantial and material
changes of circumstance. (R. 30-31, 198-201, 577-580.) More importantly, the record is
-8-

devoid of Marlene claiming that the Judgment was obtained by fraud or lack of jurisdiction
or lack of due process in the rendering state. Such allegations appear nowhere in her two
petitions to modify the California Judgment. (R. 30-31, 198-201, 577-580.)
8.

Apparently, when Marlene did not get what she wanted from the Fourth

District Court, she expressed her total disdain for the court and showed no desire to comply
with the order as is evident from her letter to Gerald. (R. 25-26.)
9.

After Gerald attempted to enforce the Judgment and upon the advice of

counsel, on June 30, 1980, he (in addition to his counsel, Marlene, and Marlene's counsel)
entered into a stipulation attempting to modify the Judgment in a Utah court. This attempt
resulted in alimony being assessed Gerald in the amount of $1.00 per year. (R. 62.)
10.

Since the entry of the Judgment, the jurisdiction of the California Superior

Court was not meritoriously challenged by Marlene. She personally appeared, and at one
time was represented by several California attorneys. (R. 715-722)
11.

After Marlene moved to Utah, a "bi-state filing war" commenced, fought in

California and Utah. Marlene submitted herself to California jurisdiction in this "filing war".
(R. 728, 720-729)
12.

It appears that Marlene was judge and court-shopping, that when a court in one

state ruled against her, she would go to the court in another state. Consequently, inconsistent
judgments were obtained. (R. 725-729)
13.

At least three orders were issued by the Fourth District Court purporting to

modify the spousal support award in the California decree. (R. 126-127 [1983 order], 221-9-

223 [April 24, 1991 order], R. 473-476 [April 13, 1995 order].) These orders substantially
modified the amount of support decreed by the California court. The first order did not
affect alimony. (R. 126-127.) The second Fourth District Court modification order modified
the $600 alimony award of the California Judgment, increasing "temporary family support
for the support of the plaintiff and minor children of the parties . . . . " to $3,000 per month.
(R. 221, 221-223.) The third order increased Gerald's alimony obligation to $2,235 per
month. (R. 473-476.) None of these Utah modification orders even mentions the California
courts, California jurisdiction, California orders in existence, or that Utah is specifically
modifying the California support order(s). (R. 126-127 [1983 order], 221-223 [April 24,
1991 order], R. 473-476 [April 13, 1995 order].)
14.

At the same time, Marlene submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the

originating decree state - California Superior Court in various attempts to modify spousal
support during the same or similar periods she was doing the same in the Fourth District
Court of the State of Utah. The California Superior Court entered several orders modifying
Gerald's spousal support and custody of the minor children. (R. 209-214,305-310,715-720
[August24,1987 order], 547-548 [November 16,1994 order], 721-722 [March 3,1989], and
723-724 [May 5, 1993]. The order of August 24, 1987 modified the alimony award in the
Judgment to $1,000 per month. (R. 718.) The order of November 16, 1994 modified the
alimony award to $500 per month. (R. 548.) During the time period of 1987 through 1994,
the California Superior Court entered orders modifying Gerald's alimony obligation. The
other two orders dealt with Marlene being dispossessed of custody of her two youngest
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children. (R. 721-722, 723-724.)
15.

On November 5, 1992, in order to obtain an Order to Show Cause, Marlene

is accused by Gerald of conspiring with the process server to have Gerald served at 55 East
1230 North, Provo, Utah, as his residence. (R. 612) Since prior to the entry of the
Judgment, Gerald has not resided in Utah. (R. 599.) The Order to Show Cause was heard
without the presence of Gerald, all in violation of his 14th Amendment rights. (R. 599-613.)
16.

Evidently, on or about January 19, 1993, Marlene again mislead the Fourth

District Court into believing that Gerald was residing at 415 Bearcat Drive, Salt Lake City,
Utah in order to serve him with another Order to Show Cause. (R. 608.) According to
Gerald, this false service and misrepresentation that he was a resident of Utah influenced the
trial court's decision that it had continuing and concurrent jurisdiction because of his Utah
address and residence. (R. 605.)
17.

The action brought by Gerald to enforce his rights of visitation occurred while

the parties had minor children. (R. 2-4.) With the entry of the May 5, 1993 California
Order, Marlene lost custody of her last and youngest child to Gerald. (R 723-724, 11)
Consequently, California became the home state for the child custody (since Gerald was a
continuing resident there) aspect of the originating decree. The California court, in its May
5,1993 order specifically stated in ^ 1: "The court finds that California has jurisdiction.,f (R.
724.) This loss of Utah home state concerning child custody occurred prior to Judge Guy
Burningham's April 13, 1995 Modification Order. (R. 473-476.)
18.

The Record is devoid of evidence that the parties entered into an express
-11-

written consent to divest California of its jurisdiction. This never occurred. California
always has been and is the decree state with continuing jurisdiction. California has always
retained continuing jurisdiction over the issue of alimony (as well as child support). (R. 724,
723-724, 24, 10-24.)
19.

Respondent has always had rights and remedies in the California dissolution

court. However, rather than avail herself of these California remedies, she has engaged in
forum shopping in an attempt to find a sympathetic court and obtain a favorable result,
something she did not receive in the latest modification action in California. (R. 724, 723724, 24, 10-24, 725-729, and the whole record.)
20.

During 1997, respondent filed an appeal with the California Court of Appeals

challenging whether the California Superior Court had the jurisdiction to enter a reduction
of spousal support order (spousal support was reduced to $500). The California Court of
Appeals reaffirmed that the court issuing the decree of divorce and the dissolution judgment,
"maintained jurisdiction over the parties and spousal support. Indeed, Ruth participated in
spousal support hearings in California after the judgment was entered and prior to August
1994." [Emphasis in the original.] The California Court of Appeals correctly referred to the
filings of the parties in California and Utah as a "bi-state filing war". (R. 725-729.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly granted Gerald's Motion to Strike Marlenefs Order to Show
Cause, finding that the Fourth District Court lacked the jurisdiction to modify the Judgment
granting Marlene's petitions to modify the Judgment's spousal support award. In the
-12-

Judgment, the California Superior Court retained jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter and, over the years, continued to exercise it. Throughout all of the proceedings in the
Fourth District Court, Gerald always remained a resident of California.

Under these

circumstances, the Fourth District Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to modify the
California Judgment when it was domesticated by Gerald in Utah for enforcement purposes
only. If Marlene wished to modify the Judgment, she should have applied to the California
court to do so. Rather, she judge and forum shopped. In Utah, a court may only modify a
spousal support order issued by another state if the Utah court has "continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over the spousal support order". Consequently, any spousal support modification
orders entered by the Fourth District Court are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
cannot be enforced.
Additionally, it appears Marlene failed to comply with Rule 3(d), 9(c), and 24(a),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. As such, her brief should be stricken and the judgment
of the trial court affirmed. She also attempted to unlawfully place documents into the record
of the Fourth District Court after Judge Laycock's ruling was entered. These documents
should also be stricken. This will be the subject of GerakTs Motion to Strike the Appellant
Brief and Affirm the Trial Court's decision.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
GERALDS MOTION TO STRIKE MARLENES ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT HAD NO SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE
-13-

CALIFORNIA JUDGMENT ON APRIL 13,1995
As can be ascertained from Marlene's brief, she appears to be claiming that the trial
court erred in granting Gerald's Motion to Strike her Order to Show Cause. However, Utah
case law is contrary to that position. The trial court decision should be affirmed. In State
of Utah Dept. of Human Services v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52; 975 P.2d 939, the Court of
Appeals decided the very issue present in the instant case and is directly on point. The issue
there concerned a Virginia spousal support order attempted to be modified by a Utah court.
The Jacoby Court stated:
In Utah, a court may only modify a spousal support order issued by
another state if the Utah court has 'continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over
the spousal support order. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45f-206(2). The method by
which a Utah court obtains 'continuing exclusive jurisdiction' over a spouse
support order is by 'issuing a support order consistent with the law of this state
. . .' Id. § 78-45f-205(6). Thus, a Utah court cannot obtain 'continuing
exclusivejurisdictionr unless it issues the spousal support order. In this case,
a Virginia court issued the spousal support order and therefore, the order could
not be modified by the court in Utah. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
decision on this issue. [Emphasis added.]
In the instant case, California originally issued the spousal support order. (R. 10-23.)
Accordingly, the Fourth District Court could not modify the California spousal support order
as it attempted to do prior to September 22, 2003. (R. 1037-1045, 221-223, 473-476.)
An analysis of § 78-45f-205 is clear that the Fourth District Court lacked the
jurisdiction to hear the pending Order to Show Cause and lacked the jurisdiction to modify
the California decree; consequently, the 1983 Order (R. 126-127), the April 24, 1991 Order
(R. 221-223), and the April 13, 1995 Order (R. 473-476) are all void due to lack of subject
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matter jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45f-205(6) states that "[a] tribunal of this state
may not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal of another state having
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45f-206(3) states that "[a] tribunal of this state which lacks continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over a spousal support order may not serve as a responding tribunal to modify
a spousal support order of another state."
In the Judgment, the California court made it clear that it retained jurisdiction over
the parties and subject matter. (R. 24.) Subsequent California modification orders also
stated that it had the jurisdiction to enter the order. (R. 724.) Additionally, Gerald has
continually resided in California since the issuance of the Judgment. (R. 599.)
Gerald initially brought the Judgment to Utah pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment
Act solely to enforce it against Marlene. (R. 2-6, 28.) Thereafter, in the Fourth District
Court, Marlene filed a petition to modify the Judgment. (R. 29-31.) Again, she did not
assert any statutory authority to do so other than allege that a substantial and material change
of circumstances had occurred.2 (R. 30-31, 198-201, 577-580.) One of the clearest Utah
cases explaining the inability of a Utah court to modify a California decree when an action
is initiated to enforce such is Bankler v. Bankler, (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 963 P.2d 797. In that
case, a California decree which "specifically 'maintained jurisdiction over spousal support

2

As set forth in the statement of facts, on June 23, 1978 when she initially filed the
petition to modify, Marlene did not allege URESA. (R. 29-31.) Ditto for her January 3,
1991 second petition to modify. In fact, at that time, she did not allege that the modification
action was being brought to RURESA. (R. 198-201.)
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. . ."' (at p.798), was domesticated in Utah. Once domesticated, the husband sought to
modify the same in the Utah court. The trial court "dismissed the petition to modify, holding
it had 'no jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce arising in a sister state, and the matter
is best handled in the sister state.'" (Id.). The husband asserted "that by domesticating the
California decree and all subsequent orders entered by the California court, [wife] subjected
herself and the case in its entirety, to the Utah court's jurisdiction." (Id.) The wife argued
"that notwithstanding language in the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, the Utah court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to modify a California divorce decree." She further argued "that
Utah statutes confer exclusive continuing jurisdiction upon the original court" . . . and
domesticating [same] does "not abrogate the California court's exclusive jurisdiction." Id.
at pp.798-799. The Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the wife. The Court of Appeal noted
the Utah Supreme Court's discussion of the limited ability of Utah courts to address issues
decided in a foreign judgment. Id. at p. 799. [Emphasis added.]
The Bankler court declared that the Utah Supreme Court "held that neither Rule 60(b)
nor our Utah Foreign Judgment Act allows our Utah courts to reopen, reexamine, or alter a
foreign judgment duly filed in this state, absent a showing of fraud or the lack ofjurisdiction
or the lack of due process in the rendering state." Since the husband did not assert "fraud or
lack of jurisdiction or due process by the California court, as required by [our Supreme
Court]", he could not seek to modify and the Utah court could not modify the California
decree. Id. at p. 800. The record is devoid of Marlene claiming that the Judgment was
obtained by fraud or lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process in the rendering state.
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The Bankler Court continued:
Actions to modify a divorce decree should 'properly be brought in the forum
which issued the decree,' Angell v. Sixth Dist. Court, 656 P.2d 405, 406-07
(Utah 1982) (per curium). In Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709,
710,711 (Utah Ct.App. 1992), a wife petitioned the Third District Court in Salt
Lake County for modification of a Fifth District Washington County divorce
decree. On appeal, this court held that 'the court issuing the original decree
retains exclusivejurisdiction to modify its decrees. Parties wishing to modify
a decree must do so in the original forum.
Although Rimensburger concerned subject matter jurisdiction of two
Utah courts, other Utah cases have discussed the question of subject matter
jurisdiction when the courts concerned are the courts of sister states. For
example, in Oglesby v. Oglesby, 29 Utah 2d 419, 510 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1973),
our supreme court addressed the question of whether a Washington state court
could modify a Utah divorce decree. Although the Washington court had
reduced the husband's support obligation, our supreme court held that the
decree could not be considered properly 'modified' by the Washington court
because the decree could only be 'changed by a duly constituted Utah court.'
Id. 510 P.2d at 1107. The court noted that constitutional problems would
arise if a 'responding state had the power to destroy the legitimate judgments
of sister states!
Similarly, in Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267, 430 P.2d 580 (1967), the Utah
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a Utah court could modify a
Nevada divorce decree. When the wife sued to enforce the judgment in Utah, the
husband counterclaimed, asserting that he had undergone such a material change of
circumstances that the decree should be modified to excuse him from making future
alimony payments. Our supreme court held 'the lower court was correct in its holding
that it had no power or authority to change or modify the Nevada judgment.' Id. at
272, 430 P.2d 580. Therefore, Utah courts may not consider a petition to
modify terms of a divorce decree entered by a foreign jurisdiction and
domesticated in Utah for enforcement purposes. The fact that Ms. Bankler
domesticated and filed all the California orders pertaining to the divorce does
not change that conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act does not confer jurisdiction on a Utah court
to prospectively modify an order issued by a foreign state court in a divorce
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action, nor does it permit reopening a judgment absent allegations of fraud,
lack of jurisdiction, or lack of due process. We therefore affirm the trial
court's judgment." [Emphasis added.]
M a t pp. 800-801.
The Bankler court meticulously reviewed Utah Supreme Court cases and other
authorities in concluding that Utah courts cannot modify an out -of-state decree such as was
done in the instant case. In accord, Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah
App. 1992) ["The question of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction 'goes to the very
power of a court to entertain an action.'" The Rimensburger court also held that modification
of a decree from the District Court of another county in Utah or from another state should
"properly be brought in the forum which issued the decree .... To hold otherwise would do
great mischief to orderly judicial process and would encourage forum shopping."]
This forum shopping by Marlene and insistence that the Fourth District Court hear her
petitions and/or orders to show cause to modify the California divorce decree have resulted
in inconsistent judgments and have created judicial chaos, in addition to the damage done
to Gerald, as a result of these inconsistent judgments. (R. 221, 221-223, 473-476.) For
instance, in August, 1987, Gerald was ordered by the California court to pay $1,000 per
month as alimony. (R. 718.) Then Fourth District Court Commissioner Maetani entered a
temporary order obliging him to pay $3,000 spousal and child per month, "until this court
hears the matter on its merits." (R. 221.) Subsequently, Gerald was then ordered on
November 16, 1994 to pay alimony in an amount of $500 per month. (R. 548.) At this time,
if Gerald did not pay $500 per month, he would have been in contempt of the California
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court. If he did not pay $3,000 per month without any distinction as to what portion would
be alimony, he would be in contempt of the Fourth District Court.
If ever there were a case that made the Bankler statement that" constitutional problems
would arise if a 'responding state had the power to destroy the legitimate judgments of sister
states", this certainly is one. This madness should stop and this Court should affirm the
decision of the trial court which granted Gerald's Motion to Strike the Order to Show Cause
of Marlene. Marlene's first petition clearly demonstrates that the Utah Court never had the
requisite subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Originating Court's Dissolution Decree.
This case also demonstrates the prophetic insight of the Rimensburger court that held that
modification of a decree from the District Court of another county in Utah or from another
state should "properly be brought in the forum which issued the decree.... To hold otherwise
would do great mischief to orderly judicial process and would encourage forum shopping."
Additionally, Rimensburger, supra, is directly on point. The Fifth District Court in
Washington County, Utah entered a decree of divorce in January, 1981. More than ten years
later, the wife petitioned the Third District Court in Salt Lake County for modification. The
Salt Lake County Court, over the objections of the husband, assumed jurisdiction of the
modification action. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed this assumption of modification
and held that the Third District Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
modification action. In so holding, it stated:
Thus, the court issuing the original decree retains exclusive jurisdiction to
modify its decrees. Parties wishing to modify a decree must do so in the
original forum. See Angell v. Sixth District Court, 656 P.2d 405,406-07 (Utah
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1982) (per curium) (actions to modify divorce decree should 'properly be
brought in the forum which issued the decree'). A party can no more ask a
different court to modify a divorce decree already entered that it can ask a
different court for a new trial in a case otherwise concluded To hold
otherwise would do great mischief to orderly judicial process and would
encourage forum shopping. [Emphasis added.]
M a t 710.
This is exactly what Marlene has done in this case. She has (albeit successfully)
asked the Fourth District Court to modify a California divorce decree (where the California
court expressly retained jurisdiction) in order to do great mischief to orderly judicial process
and has forum shopped to do so. This should stop here. "The question of whether a court
has subject matter jurisdiction 'goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action.'"
Rimensburger, at 710 (citing with approval Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah
App. 1990). Since the Fourth District Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction, it lacks
the power to entertain action below. Consequently, the decision of the trial court should be
affirmed.
A. The April 4, 1991, Temporary Order
Rendered By Commissioner Maetani Is Also
Void For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
For the same reasons set forth hereinabove, the April 4,1991 Temporaiy Order is void
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. First, the order by its terms is only temporaiy. (R.
221-223.) Second, this April 4, 1991 order, also by its terms, merged into the April 13,
1995 order. This ordered ended with "until this court hears the matter on its merits." (R.
221.) The only time the case was alleged heard on its merits was at the hearing from which
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the April 13, 1995 came. (R. 473-476.) Additionally, the Commissioner is not a judge; yet,
the Commissioner entered an order rather than a recommendation. Finally, the Temporary
Order fails to specify what portion of the $3,000 is alimony and what portion is child
support. (R. 221-223.) Since the entry of this Temporary Order is derivative of Gerald's
initial attempt to domestic the Judgment, it should be rendered void for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. (R. 2-6, 28.)
n.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
GERALD'S MOTION TO STRIKE BASED UPON THE
FACT THAT CALIFORNIA HAS EXCLUSIVE,
CONTINUING JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THIS ACTION
In State of Utah, Dept. of Human Services v. Jacoby, supra, the Utah Court of
Appeals made it perfectly clear that the originating state had exclusive and continuing
jurisdiction over the decrees entered by it. This is especially so in this case where the
California court issuing the Judgment expressly affirmed that it had continuing jurisdiction
over the parties and the issue of spousal support. (R. 24.) Even assuming otherwise, another
state cannot purport to dictate to this state whether Utah has subject matter jurisdiction. This
determination is in the exclusive province of Utah.
It is the Utah Court of Appeals desire to eliminate the erroneous assumption of
concurrent jurisdiction. This is exactly the case here. We have judicial chaos as a result of
Utah attempting to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with California. We have inconsistent
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judgments. Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1176, 1177 (Utah Ct.App.1991).3 The
continuing jurisdiction of the issuing court (California) is exclusive. Other states do not have
jurisdiction to modify the decree. They must respect and defer to the prior state's continuing
jurisdiction. "Although the new state becomes a child's home state,4 significant connection
jurisdiction continues in the state of the prior decree where the court record and other
evidence exists where one parent or another contestant continues to reside." Id. at 1177.
The Crump court cited State in Interest ofD.SK., 792 P.2d 118, 124 (Utah App.1990),
which held "[a]s long as the decree state retains jurisdiction there is no concurrent
jurisdiction to modify a decree under the UCCJA."

California undeniably retained

continuing jurisdiction and exercised the same subsequent to rendering the Judgment. (R.
24, 209-214, 305-310, 715-720 [August 24, 1987 order], 547-548 [November 16, 1994
order], 721-722 [March 3, 1989], and 723-724 [May 5, 1993].)
In 2000, the decision in State of Utah, in the interest of A.M. S. andA.S., person under
2s

Crump did an analysis under the PKPA and UCCJA. Under the PKPA analysis, Utah
"must decline to exercise jurisdiction unless the court of the other State no longer has
jurisdiction, or has declined to exercise such . . . ." In the instant case, California has
continued to exercise jurisdiction over Gerald and Marlene and has entered orders modifying
custody and support.
Under the UCCJA analysis of this case, California also has exclusive continuing
jurisdiction because it has continued to exercise such even when the Fourth District Court
has also done so. "Only when the child and all parties have moved away is deference to
another state's continuing jurisdiction no longer required."
4

At the time of the April 13, 1995 Order, California was the home state for Gerald
since he, the year previous, had gained custody of the youngest child of the parties. No more
minor children were present in Utah. (R. 721-722, 723-724.) According to Gerald, the
children either ran away from home to avoid Marlene's abusive and intolerable conduct or
moved to California to be with Gerald. (R. 301-304.)
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eighteen years of age, K.P.S. v. State of Utah, 2000 UT App. 182,4 P.3d 95, 98, was issued.
This case dealt directly with the state issuing the support decree of Judgment had exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction over that support decree and Judgment:
Under the UCCJA, because the Arizona court made the initial custody
determination when all parties resided in Arizona and Father continues to so
reside, a Utah court generally may not modify that determination. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1996); Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995) [stating that the decree state continues to have jurisdiction when
Father continues to reside there and have visitation contact with children and
f
the continuing jurisdiction of the court in which the decree originated is
intended to remain exclusive']; Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah
Ct.App. 1991) [holding that jurisdiction did not shift to Utah from Montana
when mother and children moved to there because Father remained in
Montana); In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 124 [The jurisdiction of state A continues
and is exclusive as long as the husband lives in state A . . . .' (Citation
omitted; emphasis omitted). Hence, Father is correct that ordinarily the
maternal grandparents should have brought their request for custody and the
evidence of abuse on which it was based to the Arizona court. [Emphasis
added.]
As can be seen from the foregoing, since Gerald has always resided in California and
the California court retained jurisdiction to modify the Judgment and, has in fact, modified
the Judgment several times (R. 209-214,305-310,715-720,547-548,721-722, and 723-724),
the California court has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support.
Therefore, the decision of the trial court was proper in holding that the Fourth District Court
lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear Marlene's pending Order to Show Cause since
it is based on a void judgment, void because the Utah court purporting to modify the
Judgment lacked the jurisdiction to do so.

III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT SINCE THE UTAH COURT LACKED THE
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SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE
CALIFORNIA JUDGMENT, NO ACTIONS OF GERALD
HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE LACK OF
JURISDICTION
Crump, supra, at pp. 1173 and 1174, discussed at length the issue of jurisdiction. In
so doing, it stated:
. . . . If a court lacks jurisdiction 'it has not power to entertain the suit/ Curtis
v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) (Citation omitted). Not only
can a court not entertain the suit, the parties cannot cure the jurisdictional
defect by a waiver or consent. Mrs. Crump's argument, and the dissent's
assertion that because 'Mr.. Crump voluntarily and affirmatively engaged the
Utah courts ... he waived any question regarding the authority of the Utah
courts to decide the issue ... and has thus waived any objection to the district
court's authority to exercise its jurisdiction,' it is without merit. We held that
while defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived, subject matter
jurisdiction goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action. A lack of
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver.
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and when
subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the court can
do any thing to fill that void.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The issue of waiver has been
addressed by this court, see id., by our supreme court, and by the federal
courts of appeal. See, e.g., McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1484-85
(11th Cir.); cert, denied by Jenson v. McDougald, 479 U.S. 860, 93 L. Ed.2d
13, 107 S.Ct. 207 (1986) [No waiver of jurisdictional defect in modification
of child custody case even where father had consented to jurisdiction of
Washington court, which court did not have jurisdiction]; A.J. Mackay Co. v.
OklandConstr. Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 323,325 (Utah 1991) ['Acquiescence of the
parties is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court, and a lack of
jurisdiction can be raised by the court or either party at any time.']; see also
Annotation, Child Custody: When Does State That Issued Previous Custody
Determination Have Continuing Jurisdiction Under Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) Or Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA).
28 USCS § 1738A, 83 ALR 4th 742, 748 (1991) hereinafter Annotation
(Citation omitted) ['Subject matter jurisdiction under the relevant child custody
statutes cannot be vested by agreement of the parties, even though all of the
parties desire an adjudication on the merits, and such jurisdiction cannot be
-24-

conferred on the court by a party's failure to interpose a timely objection to the
court's assumption of jurisdiction.'].
The Crump court went on to hold that "[ujnlike the UCCJA, the PKPA 'anchors
exclusive continuing jurisdiction to modify a previous custody decree in the original home
state as long as the child or one of the contestants remains in that state."' [Emphasis in
original.] The court further stated that a state "must decline to exercise that jurisdiction
unless 'the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise
such jurisdiction to modify such determination." [Emphasis in original.] In the instant case,
California has definitely demonstrated it has not declined to exercise jurisdiction. The
modification orders set forth in the Statement of Facts demonstrates this. (R. 209-214, 305310, 715-720 [August 24, 1987 order], 547-548 [November 16, 1994], 721-722 [March 3,
1989], and 723-724 [May 5, 1993].
In accord, Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199, 29 P.3d 13, 16 ["Lack of subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver. A lack of subject
matter jurisdiction can be raised at anytime and when subject matter jurisdiction does not
exist, neither the parties nor the court can do anything to fill that void." The Utah (the decree
state) continuing jurisdiction issue of this case pivoted on whether the Father was still a
resident of the State of Utah. If he were, then the Utah court had continuing exclusive
jurisdiction. If not, then California did.] California in the present case is the decree state.
Since Gerald continues to reside there, California has continuing jurisdiction.
As stated hereinabove, the Crump court went on to hold that because the husband
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resided in Montana, the state that issued the original decree of divorce, the Utah court was
without jurisdiction to modify that Montana support decree. Gerald has always resided in
California. Therefore, the decision of the trial court to grant his Motion to Strike based upon
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper.
The June 30, 1980 stipulation of Gerald purporting to modify the Judgment in Utah
did not confer jurisdiction on the Fourth District Court. (R. 62.) The question ofjurisdiction
can be raised at any time by either the court or a party. Based upon the foregoing, clearly
the trial court's conclusion was correct - that the Fourth District Court was without
jurisdiction to hear the Order to Show Cause or to give any regard to any past Utah court
orders upon which it was based.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT
("UIFSA") APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
The Utah Legislature passed the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA")
during 1996. See § 78-45f-100, History.
Even though not controlling, the case of Child Support Enforcement Division of
Alaska v. Brenckle, 675 N.E.2d 390, 392 (Mass. 1997) is instructive on this issue:
UIFSA aims to cure the problem of conflicting support orders entered by
multiple courts and provides for the exercise of continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction by one tribunal over support orders
Under UIFSA, once one
court enters a support order, no other court may modify that order for so long
as the obligee, obligor, or child for whose benefit the order is entered
continues to reside within the jurisdiction of that court unless each party
consents in writing to another jurisdiction.
Also,
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This is consistent with the fundamental purpose of UIFSA: to 'create a uniform
basis for jurisdiction so that... only one support order is in effect at any one
time,' and to ' limit the number of tribunals having jurisdiction to modify a
child support order.

It was the express intention of the Legislature that UIFSA be applied
retrospectively; its provisions govern any URESA action that is fpending or
was previously adjudicated' It is also clear that UIFSA, like its predecessor
URESA, does not create a duty of support, but rather provides the procedural
framework for enforcing one State's support order in another jurisdiction. . .
. It is proper that UIFSA should be applied retroactively. [Emphasis added.]
Brenckle, supra, at p. 393.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's decision granting Gerald's Motion to Strike Marlene's Order to Show
Cause should be affirmed. The Utah case law appears to be unanimous that as long as
Gerald continues to reside in California and the California courts continue to exercise
jurisdiction, this state cannot modify a California Judgment. Additionally, a Judgment
brought to this state for enforcement purposes only cannot be subsequently modified. Any
subsequent modification is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
This Court should award sanctions, attorney fees and costs to Gerald as a result of
Marlene's non-compliant Notice of Appeal, Docketing Statement, briefs, and attempting to
supplement the record without consent of the trial court.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26* day of April, 2004.

David Drake
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee
Gerald D. Lundahl
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